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ADMIRALTY.-See Shipping. .
oreign Ship and Foreign Parties-.Jurisdition
of U. S.
Courts--Transhipmentof Cargo.-Where a libel was filed against
a foreign ship, in an admiralty case, in an Admiralty Court of the
United States, the libelant and claimant both being foreigners,
the place of shipping and the place of consignment being foreign
ports, and the whole ground of libel a matter which occurred
abroad, this court considered the question of jurisdiction open for
argument here, though it was not raised by the pleadings, and
had not been suggested by any one in the court below: The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall.
Where a lien exists by the maritime law of foreign jurisdiction,
our admiralty has jurisdiction to enforce it here, even though all
the parties be foreigners. Its enforcement is but a question of
comity: Id.
Semble, that by the law of Scotland, the shippers, where the
goods have been sold, lost or injured during the voyage, may
have recourse upon the vessel as a guarantee for the personal obligation of the ship owner: Id.
Under the statute of 24 and 25 Victoria, conmonly known as
the Admiralty Courts Act, jurisdiction exists in the English Courts
of Admiralty to enforce by proceedings in remn a claim by an
owner, domiciled in Canada, of a bill of lading of goods carried into
a port of Wales where the master abandoned the voyage without lawful excuse, improperly entered into a new contract of affreightment and proceeded on a distant voyage, leaving the goods
at the Welsh port, and neither carrying them himself to their port
of destination, nor seeking to forward them in another vessel: Id.
Redress may be had in our Admiralty Courts in the case of a
master thus there acting, although the ship have been a foreign
vessel and the shipment made between foreign countries, as Scotland and Canada. And this is so, whether the statute be regarded
as giving a maritime lien or only a right to sue the ship: Id.
The master of a vessel is bound to carry the goods shipped on
her to their place of destination in his own ship, unless he is prevented from so doing by the act of God, the public enemy, the act
of the shipper, or by some one of the perils excepted in the contract of shipment. When the vessel is disabled in the course of the
voyage and cannot be seasonably repaired to perform it, he is bound
to tranship the goods and send them forward in another vessel, if
one can be had in the same or in any reasonably contiguous port: Id.
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Entry of Master in the Wrong .Port.-A captain who, in the
night and in a fog, enters a port, supposing it to be his port of destination, enters at his peril of its being so, unlbss there has been
some necessity for his seeking a port. If there has been proper
ground to doubt whether the port was the one which he supposed
it to be, and he could safely wait outside till morning, or could signal a tug-boat to pilot him in, he should not prcceed till he can see
or know where he is going: The Portsmouth, 9 Wall.
A loss of a part of the cargo by a jettison resorted to in order
to lighten the boat after she had run aground in consequence of
violating such a dictate of prudence, is not a loss by dangers of the
navigation within the meaning of a bill of lading having an exception in those terms: Id.
A vessel proceeding in the night andina fog into port, is bound
to proceed at a low rate of speed: Id.
If a vessel is stranded, it is the duty of the captain" to take all
possible care of the cargo. If the vessel must be lightened before
she can get of, he should get lighters, if possible, and land it, not
make a jettison of it: Id.
Practice-Appeal to Supreme Court-Names of Parties.-A
writ of error or appeal to this court cannot be sustained in the name
of a steamboat, or any other than a human being, or some corporate
or associated aggregation of persons: Steamboat Burns, 9 Wall.
The acts of the State legislatures authorizing suits to be sustained
by or against steamboats by name, confer no right so to sustain
them in the Federal courts: Id.
Any person, however, who in the State courts, has substantially
made himself a party to the case, by aiserting on the record his
interest in the vessel, and conducting the defense in the highest
court of the State, may prosecute a writ of error in his own name
in this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act: Id.
Collision-avigationin Narrow Channels.-A steam vesse
entering a short, narrow, and artificial channel, in some parts shoal
such as the "Straight Cut" at Milwaukee, in which it is liable to
meet tugs coming from the other end with tows, is bound to exercise caution as to the way it enters and proceeds, and to have and
keep itself, both as to course and rate of speed, entirely under control : The Alleghany, 9 Wall.
Narrow Channels- Carein Naviqating.-Steamers navigating
in crowded channels and in the vicinity of wharves, must be run
and managed with great caution, and with a strict regard to the
established rules of navigation, including that one which requires
them, when approaching from opposite directions, to put their
helms to port. If they are about to attempt any mancuvre not
usual and clearly safe, such as running in under the bows of another vessel in motion, they must not only sound their whistle or
give the other proper signal, but before attempting the manceuvre
must be certain also that the signal was heard and understoodby
the approaching vessel: Th7e Jhnson, 9 Wall.
COLLISION.-See Admiralty.
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COMMON CARRIER.

Grain Barge-Grainin Bulk-Seaworthinessof Vessel.-It Is
the duty of the carrier of grain in bulk, in barges on our Western
rivers, in the way now usual, as distinguished from the old way
in sacks, to see that his barge is capable of resisting, without subjecting the cargo to injury, all the external forces to which it is
subjected in the ordinary course of navigation, including especially
those incident to the narrow, crooked and shallow water, and the
often-changing courses in the currents of the rivers where they
are ; and to the force with which the large steamers which have
them'in tow are often brought against their sides in landing, as
they do, for the purposes of their ordinary business, every few
miles on the river: The Northern Belle, 9 Wall.
The barge must be so tight that the water will not reach the
cargo, so strong that these ordinary applications of external force
will not spring a leak or sink her, so sound that she will safely
carry the cargo in bulk through these ordinary shocks to which
she must every day be subjected. If she is capable of this she is
seaworthy; if she is not, she is unfit for the navigation of the river
No other test can be given, and this must be determined by the
facts in each particular case: Id.
It is the duty of the carrier to have his barges often examined
and thoroughly inspected so as to be sure of their condition. He
should not use a barge after she has become from age or decay or
injury unfit for use, and should repair them often and well, so
long as they can, by repairing, be safely used, and no longer. For
this he is to be held rigidly responsible: Id.
Special Contract-Negligence.-A common carrier cannot contract against liability for loss from his own ordinary negligence.
Such a condition is void as against public policy: I. P. and C. R.
R. Co. v. Allen, 31 Ind. "
A contract for the shipment of live stock by a railroad company
provided, that in consideration of a certain reduced rate of transportation, the owner of said stock should assume all risks of injuries which the animals or either of them might receive in consequence of any of them being wild, unruly, vicious, weak, escaping,
maiming and killing themselves or each other, or from delays, or
in consequence of heat, suffocation, or the ill effects ofbeing crowded
upon the cars of said company, or on account of being injured by
the burning of hay, straw, or any other material used by the owner
in feeding the stock, or otherwise, and any damage occasioned
thereby, and also all risk of any loss or damage which might be
sustained by reason of any delay, or from any other cause or thing
in or incident to, or from, or in, the loading or unloading of said
stock; that said owner should load and unload said stock at his
own risk, the railroad company furnishing the necessary laborers
to assist, under the direction and control of said owner, who should
examine for himself all the means used in loading and unloading,
to see that they were of sufficient strength, of the right kind, and
it%good repair and order ; that each person riding free to take care
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and charge 'of said stock, should do so at his own risk of personal
injury from whatever cause; and that the owner should release,
and hold harmless, and keep indemnified, the railroad company, from
all damages, actions, claims and suits, on account of any and every
injury, loss and damage heretofore referred to, if any should occur
or happen. Suit against the railroad company to recover for certain animals shipped by the plaintiff, under this contract, and lost,
while in course of transportation, by escaping through a window
open in the end of a car in which they had been loaded by the
plaintiff's agent, who accompanied them on the route, and who,
after the escape of one of the animals, told the conductor to fix said
window, and the conductor not doing so, fixed it himself: Held,
that the railroad company was liable for th. loss: II.
CONFEDERATE STATEs.-See Execution.
Prosecutionfor Treason against-Ation of Trespassfor.- A
prosecution in a so-called "court of the Confederate States of
America," for treason, in aiding the troops of the United States in
the prosecution of a military expedition against the said Confederate States, is a nullity, and the fact that the tribunal had clothed
itself in the garb of the law gives no protection to persons who,
assuming to be its officers, were the instruments by which it acted:
Hickman v. Jones et al., 9 Wall.
The fact that a man was himself a traitor against the United
States, does not necessarily prevent his recovering damages against
other traitors, for having maliciously arrested and imprisoned him
before a so-called court of the Confederate States, for being a traitor
to these; the alleged treason having consisted in his giving aid to
the troops of the United States while engaged in suppressing the
rebellion: Id.
Captured Property-Acts of Claimant in aid of Rebellion.Claimants under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, of
March 12, 1863, are not deprived of the benefits of that act because of aid and comfort not voluntarily given by them to the rebellion: United States v.Padelford, 9 Wall.
But voluntarily executing as surety, through motives of personal
friendship to the principals, the official bonds of persons acting as
quarter-masters or as assistant commissaries in the rebel army, was
giving aid and comfort to the rebellion, although the principals,
by their appointment to the offices named, escaped active military
service, and were enabled to remain at home in the discharge of
their offices respectively: Id.
Taking possession of a city by the national forces was not, of
itself, and without some actual seizure of it in obedience to the orders of the commanding general, a capture within the meaning of
the act, of the cotton which happened to be in the city atthe time
of the entry of the forces: Id.
Hence, where prior to any such seizure an owner of cotton, who
though opposed to the rebellion, had given aid and comfortto it to the extent above mentioned, but was not within any of the classes
excepted by the President's proclamation of December 8, 1863, and
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in regard to whose property in the cotton no rights of third per.
sons had intervened-took the oath prescribed by thatactand kept
it: Held, after a seizure and sale of the cotton by the government, that he was entitled to the net proceeds as given to loyal
owners under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. Having been pardoned, his offense, in executing the bonds, could -not
be imputed to him: Id.
Confederate Notes.-In ordinary dealings during the war, without design to aid the rebellion, Confederate treasury notes were a
sufficient consideration to support a contract: Kingsbury v. Lyon
64N. C.
Acts of State Authorities-When Valid.-The distinction between such acts of the State authorities during the recent war as
are valid, and such as are not, turas upon the inquiry whether or
not they were extraordinary, arising out of the condition of things
and intended to obstruct or modify some part of the policy of the
United States in regard to the rebellion, or not: Leak v. Commissioners of Richmond Co., 64 N. C.
Measures taken during the war by parties, whether States,
counties or individuals, the object of which was to counteract plans
set on foot by the United States for the suppression of the rebellion, were, and are, contrary to the public policy of that government; and so contracts arising out of them cannot be enforced:
Therefore, notes taken for money lent in 1862, to a county to enable it to provide salt for its citizens, and thus avoid one of the
penalties of blockade, are void: Id.
The present State and county authorities are under no obligation to fulfill contracts made by their predecessors during the rebellion, unless they come within the provision of the Ordinance of
1865 (October 18th), " Declaring what laws and ordinances are
in force," etc., and that requires such as it validates to be "consistent with allegiance to the United States," which is not true of
the transaction in question: Id.
The burden of proving that any act of the State authorities during the late rebellion which may be under debate, was "consistent
with allegiance," is owing to the general position of those authorities, upon the party who asserts it: Id.
Transactions like that under consideration fall under the provisions of the Ordinance of 1865 (October 19th), and the Constitution of 1868 (Art. VIII. § 13), forbidding the payment of obligations incurred in aid of the rebellion, directly or indirectly: Id.
Those prohibitions are merely declaratory of principles of the
common law in regard to contracts, and therefore do not impair
the obligation of the contracts referred to: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-See Internal Revenue.

Retrial of Cases Already Tried by Jury.-Act of 1863.-Tbe
provisionin the seventh amendment ofthe Constitution of the United
States, which declares that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States than according to
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the rules of the common law, applies to the facts tried by a jury in
a cause in a State court: The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall.
So much of the fifth section of the Act of Congress of March 3,
1863, entitled "An act relating to habeas corpus and regulating
proceedings in certain cases," as provides for the removal of a judgment in a State court, and in which the cause was tried by a jury,
to the Circuit Court of the United States for a re-trial on the facts
and law, is not in pursuance to the constitution, and is void: Id.
CONTRAOT.

Consideration-Failureof-Sale.-Suit on a note. Answer,
that the defendant bought of the payee a certain number of fruit
trees; that it was agreed by them that said trees should be in good
condition, and that if any of them should not grow, the seller would
replace them with other trees; and that on the day the note was
given (in November), the seller delivered said trees, and represented
them to be as provided for by said contract; that the defendant not
being experienced in the nursery business, believing the trees to be
as represented, in consideration thereof executed the note, and
properly set out the trees; that the same were not in good condition, but were wilted, and in bad condition, and wholly worthless;
that defendant did not and could not know their condition till long
after the note was executed; that they did not grow, of whichthe seller had notice on the first day of the next June; yet he had wholly
failed to replace them: held, that the answer was good on demurrer: Morehea v. Murray, 31 Ind.
The trees were delivered to the buyer upon his written order
directed to the seller, for certain trees at specified prices: hbld,
that parol evidence was admissible to prove an agreement of the
parties at the time of making said order, that the seller should replace any of the trees that might not grow: Id.
As steps in proving the authority of one as an agent in the
transaction in controversy, evidence of his similar transactions
with different persons and of his declarations therein was held admissible: Id.
Destructionof Subject by Firebefore Performance.-After the
execution of a written contract for the sale of a house and lot, and
before the day fixed for the delivery of the possession, and payment
of the first installment of the purchage-money, the house was accidentally destroyed by fire, without fault of either party or of the
tenant then in possession. The vendor had a fee simple title to the
property, and at the proper time, under the contract, offered to deliver possession of the premises in the condition in which they
then were. This the vendee refused to receive. On a bill filed by
the vendor for a specific performance of the contract: held, that
from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agreement for its sale, he holds the same in trust for the purchaser, and
the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor.
and being thus in equity, the owner, the vv.ndee must bear any loss
which may happen, and is entitled to any benefit which may accrue

*So
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to the estate in the interim, between the agreement and conveyance: Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md.
EASEMENT.

Covenants Creating Run with the Land.-Covenants creating
easements, run with the land, even as against assignees in fee,
where the intent to create them is clear, the easements themselves
apparent, and the covenants consistent with public policy, and so
qualifying and regulating the mode of enjoying the easements, as,
that if disregarded, the latter will be substantially different from
what is intended: Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. 0.
Tlerefore, a covenant to repair a canal dug for the purpose of
draining the lands of the parties to the covenant, runs with such
lands, and binds a subsequent purchaser in fee: Id.
A party thus.bound is entitled to notice of a call to contribute
after the repairs have been done; and the want of such notice,
even where, previously to the making of the repairs,he had di.xclaimed liability therefor, is fatal to an action against him: Id.
Covenants are the proper mode of creating such servitudes as
consist in acts to be done by the owner of the servient land: Id.
EQUITY.

Irregularitiesin a Sale by a Sheriff cognizable only in the
Courtfrom which the Execution issued.-M purchased of B, by
parol agreement, a house and lot for $900, to be paid from time to
time, as convenient to M, to whom, on the payment of the entire
purchase-money, the property was to be conveyed in fee by a clear
and undisputed title. At the time of making the agreement, a part
of the purchase-money was paid by M, who shortly thereafter entered into possession-other part of the purchase money was subsequently paid. Sometime afterward B died, leaving children;
W was appointed his administrator, and as such recovered judgment against M for the unpaid purchase-money; execution was
issued thereon, and the property was sold and purchased by W,
for the debt, interest and costs, who applied for a writ of possession, upon the refusal of M to surrender the property. M filed a
bill against the administrator and heirs-at-law of B, alleging these
facts, and charging fraudulent misrepresentations to him by B, at
the time of the sale, as to his having an undisputed title to the property, when, in fact, he had none, and also irregularities and defects
in the proceedings of the sheriff by whom the sale to W was made.
The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain the execution of the
writ of possession, and perpetually to enjoin the judgment recovered against M, and for a decree declaring the original sale to him
void for fraud and want of consideration, and that the money paid
by him be refunded, and for general relief. The injunction was issued
as prayed. Answers were filed for the adult defendants, denying the
material allegations of the bill, and the minors answered by guardian ad litem: held, that the alleged regularities and defects in the
proceedings of the sheriff, by whom the sale to W was made. were
within the cognizance only of the court from which the execution
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issued, and to which the return was made. They were not within
the jurisdiction of a court of equity: Wilson v. Miller, 30 Md.
ESTOPPEL.
False IBepresentations.-A false representation not acted upon
by him to whom it is made does not estop: Denries v. Haywood
64, N. C.
The maxim ex turpicausa non orituractio,does not apply to prevent a party to a statement from maintaining an action in which
it becomes necessary for him to show such statement to be false: Id.
EVIDENCE.-See Contract.
Proofof Paperson file in Government Offices.-The proper
mode of proving papers on file, in any of the departments or public offices of the government, is by procuring certified copies from
those persons who have them in custody. The counsel for the
government cannot be compelled to produce either such copies or
the originals for the benefit of parties who may be litigating with
the government. Barney v. Schmeider, 9 Wall.
Notice, therefore, to the party or counsel representing the government to produce such paper does not authorize the party giving the notice to use other copies than those properly certified as
above stated: Id.
EXECUTION.
Satisfaction-ConfederateNotes.-A sheriff who was instructed
by the plaintiff to receive upon an execution "cash in bank bills
of the state or specie," received upon it its amount in Confederate
currency, and endorsed " Satisfied;" upon returning it to the
clerk, his attention was drawn to the instructions upon the writ,
and thereupon he withdrew it, erased "satisfied," and entered
"Received, August 30th, 1864, the amodnt of this execution in
Confederate currency notes, which plaintiff refused to accept:"
held, that the judgment was not discharged; and therefore that
the defendant had no right at a subsequent term to move that alias
writs of execution which had been issued should be set aside:
McKay v. Smitherman, 64 N. C.
An execution can be satisfied only by a seizure and sale of property ; or by payment in coin, or in such currency as the plaintiff
gives the officer express or implied authority to receive : Id.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

Nrote for Counsel .Fees.-A note given by an executor to an attorney for counsel in his office as executor, is payable by the maker
personally, and not as executor: Kessler v. Hall, 64 N. C.
Parol evidence of an understanding that it was to be paid out
of the testator's assets only, is not admissible: Id.
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FzDOmA AND STATE CounTs.-See Admiralty,InternalBeuenue,

Constitutional Law.
Mandamus from Federal Court to State Oficer.-Mandamus from a Federal court to officers of a county in a State, to levy
a tax to pay interest on bonds issued by the county on which a
relator has obtained judgment, and has no means of obtaining satisfaction but by the levy of a tax, cannot be, in any way, controlled
by an injunction from the State court to those officers against a
levy: BRiggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, affirmed; The Supervisors v. Durant,9 Wall.

It makes no difference whether the relator have been made a
defendant to the proceeding in the State court for an injunction or
not, no whether the injunction have issued before or after his suit
in the Federal court was begun: Id
HUSBAND

AND

WIFE.

Deed of Separation-Husbandas Trustee of Wife's Separate
Moneys.-A covenant by a husband for the maintenance of the
wife, contained in a deed of separation between them, through the
medium of trustees, where the consideration is apparent, must now
be regarded on authority as valid, nowithstanding the serious objections to such deeds. It will accordingly be enforced in equity,
if it appear that the deed was not made in contemplation of a future possible separation, but inrespeetto one which was to occur immediately, or for the continuance of one that bad already taken
place. And this especially if the separation was occasioned by the
misconduct of the husband and the provision for the wife's support
was reasonable under the circumstances, and no more than a court
before which she was entitled to carry her grievances would have
decreed to her as alimony: Walker v. Walker's Executor, 9 Wall.
The validity of such a covenant is not impaired by the fact that
the deed contains a provision that if the parties should afterward
come together, the trust should remain and be executed in like
manner, as if they should remain separate: Id.
A husband may be chargeable as trustee with the income of his
wife's separate property, and if he have received it from her, to in.
vest it for her, and have not invested it, he will be so charged at
her suit, whether the income be of property which he has settled
upon her or beincome from some other separateproperty of hers: Id.
The Federal courts, where they have jurisdiction, will enforce for
the furtherance of justice the same rules in the adjustment of claims
against anciliary executors, that the local courts would do in favor
of their own citizens: 1d.
A widow by being a mere formal party to a deed of compromise
between the heirs-at-law of a decedent and his residuary devisees,
by which a specific sum is given to the former and the residue of
tl'e estate to the latter, does not estop herself from coming upon the
estate with'a claim for separate moneys of hers, received by her husband to invest for her, but which he did not so invest; she having
done nothing tv conceal her claim from the residuary devisces, and
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the "residue" which the heirs surrendered having been a residue
after the proper settlement of the estate: Id.
Nor does she estop herself from asserting such a claim against
her husband's executors, by her acceptance of a provision under his
will which makes a limited provision for her to be received, with
income under a certain trust deed, in satisfaction of dower: Id.
The estate of a husband who had maltreated his wife, and ob.
tained from her the income of her separate property under apromise
to invest it for her, but who did not so invest it, charged after his
death with interest compounded annually, through a long term of
years, and deprived of all commissions for services as trustee: Id.
Married Women-Separate Real !Estate-Contract.-Inthis
State a married woman can charge her real estate by such contracts only as are reasonably calculated to make the estate profitably to her, or to preserve it, or to protect her title thereto: Smith
v. Howe and Wife, 31 Ind.
A married woman who owns real estate inher own separate right
and is in the habit of making contracts in her own name without the
co-operation of her husband, who has abandoned her and is residing in another State, cannot charge such real estate by her written
agreement to pay a certain sum to a third person if he will tell'
her the whereabouts of her husband, so that she can find him: Id.
INSURANOE.

risk---ConAlteration of building-Construction-Carpenter's
structive notice to the Cowpany of an alterationin aPolicy of Insurznce-ConcurrentInsurance.-Inthe absence of any express provision on the subject in a policy against fire, the making of repairs
or additions to, or the erection of adjacent buildings, whereby there
was a material increase of risk by fire to the property insured, will
notprevent arecovery unless the loss was produced in a whole or in
partby such increase ofrisk: WashingtonIns. Co. v. Davison,30 Md.
The term "carpenters," employed in the third section of the seventeenth condition of the policy of insurance, entitled "Risks-specially hazardous," is simply a prohibition on the use of the insured
premises, for the purpose of carrying on therein the work or business
of a carpenter, or converting them into a carpenter's shop ; it has no
reference or application to the erection by carpenters of an adjacent
ground, when the insured premises are not used by them as a
workshop for that purpose. To avoid the policy under this condition, the insured premises must themselves be used for the purpose
of carrying on the prohibited trade.
Evidence by the insurance company, through its secretary as an
expert, to show that the term "carpenters" used in its policy was
generally understood, in the office of the company, to refer to the
employment and work of carpenters in erecting or adding to buildings insured, is inadmissible: Id.
An insurer taking a risk upon a sulphuric acid manufactory is
presumed to know and to have contemplated all the causualities and
incidents to which the subject insured might be liable as such mann29

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

factory, and to have known all the requisites and adjuncts belonging
thereto: and if he inspects the premises by himself or his agents, he
has notice of all an expert ought to know from.such inspection, and
is bound by knowledge to that extent, and cannot set up in defense
the ignorance or incapacity of the inspectors he employs: Id.
The Washington Fire Insurance Company having been applied to
for insurance on certain property, for its own convenience and without the request or authority of the party seeking the insurance, applied to the Maryland Fire Insurance Company to share the risk;
the premises were examined by the secretaries of the two companies
together, with a view of faking the risk conjointly; both policies as
originally drawn were precisely similar, of the same date, for the
same amount, and both were altered in the same particulars before
the premiums were paid, which were paid to both companies on the
same day: held, that the policy issued by the Maryland Fire Insurance Company was neither prior nor subsequent to the policy
issued by the Washington Fire Insurance Company, but took effect
contemporaneously with it: and therefore the non-endorsement in
writing on the policy issued by the Washington Fire Insurance
Company, that another insurance had been effected in the Maryland
Fire Insurance Company did not render the former policy void
under the proviso contained therein, that "if any other insurance
has been or shall hereafter be made on the said property," without
the consent of the company in writing endorsed thereon, the policy
shall be void: Id.
An alteration was made in a policy of insurance by a clerk whose
authority to do so was denied by the company, who also denied all
knowledge of the alteration until after the fire which destroyed the
insured premises: at the time of making the alteration the clerk
made a corresponding alteration in the record of the policy in the
record book, in which all policies issued by the company were recorded: held, that the record in the books of the company kept
by it for the sole purpose of recording its policies was constructive notice to the company, by which it was as effectually bound
as by actual notice: Id.
Abandonment-Acceptance by Insurer.-If a party assuring a
vessel which has been sunk gives notice that he abandons her, as for
a total loss, when by the terms of the policy he has no right so to
abandon, the company, even if not accepting the abandonment, will
nevertheless make itself liable as for atotal loss, if taking possession
of the vessel under the provisions of the policy, for the purpose of
raising, repairing and returning her, they do not raise, repair and return in a reasonable time. Holding the vessel for an unreasonable
time is a constructive acceptance of the abandonment: Coplin v.
Insurance Company, 9 Wall.
This is so, notwithstanding there is a provision in the policy that
the acts of the insurers, in preserving, securing or saving the
property insured, in case of danger or disaster, should not be considered or held an acceptance of abandonment. The provision
refers only to authorized acts: rd.
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Action on Policy.-B, an insurance broker in Baltimore made an
application to the Phoenix Insurance Co., of New York, for an
insurance uponthe steamer Richmond, on behalf of J. B, Jr. Upon
the application was endorsed a description of the steamer, stating her age, and her rate as "A, No. 1." While this application
was pending, C, on behalf of H, made application through B, to
the H. F. & M. Ins. Co., for the insurance of the interest of H,
in the steamer, but made no representations to B, concerning the
age or rate of the steamer, nor did he authorize B to make any
such representations, or know that any representations on that
subject had been made by B, on behalf of H. Both applications
were granted, and policies were issued to the applicants. In an
action brought by H, against the H. F. & M. Ins. Co., on the
policy issued by it to him, Held:
1st. That the fact that the defendant, in taking the risk, acted
upon representations which had previously been made by B to a
different company, and on behalf of another party with whom the
plaintiff was not in privity, could not in any manner affect the
right of the plaintiff, there being no evidence that his agent ever
adopted such representations, or had any knowledge of them.
2d. That if the defendant, in acting upon the plaintiff's application, and assuming the risk, chose to rely upon representations which
had been made on behalf of other parties in their application to a
different company for insurance, and without the knowledge of the
plaintiff or his agent, the rights of the plaintiff under the contract
would not be affected thereby: Harmony Co. Hazlehurst, 30 Md.
INTERNAL REVENUF.

Jurisdictionof the United States Courts.-The jurisdiction of
suits between citizens of the same State, in internal revenue cases,
conferred by the Act of March 2d, 1833, "further to provide for the
collection of duties on imports" (4 Stat. at Large 632), and the
Act of June 30th, 1864, "to provide internal revenue," etc. (13 Id.
241), was taken away by the Act of July 13th, 1866, "to reduce
internal taxation, and to amend an act to provide internal revenue,"
etc. (14Id. 172) : Insurance Company v. Ritche (5 Wallace, 541)
affirmed; Hornthall v. The Collector, 9 Wall.
Where such citizenship as is necessary to give jurisdiction to
the Federal courts is not averred the suit cannot be maintained : Id.
Regulation of Internal Trade of a State.-The 29th section of
the Internal Revenue Act of March 2d, 1867 (14 Stat. at Large
484), which makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, to mix for sale naptha and illuminating oils, or to sell
or offer such mixture for sale, or to sell or offer for sale oil made
of petroleum for illuminating purposes, inflammable at less temperature or first test than 110 degrees Fahrenheit, is in fact a po.
lice regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the
States: United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall.
Accordingly, it can only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress excludes, territorially, all State legislation, as for
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example in the District of Columbia.

Within State limits, it can

have no constitutional operation: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Presumptionin" Aid of Title-Adverse Possession..--Where
possession of land is shown to have existed for a great length of
time without interruption, all those circumstances or formal ceremonies which the law deems necessary to make* such possession
rightful, will be supplied by presumption, and the possession thus
supported will not be disturbed: Crook v. Glen, 30 Md.
An exclusive adverse possession for more than twenty years by
a mortgagee than those claiming under lim, without any account
or acknowledgment of a subsisting mortgage, is a complete bar to
an application for a surrender and cancellation of the mortgage,
and a delivery of the possession of the mortgaged premises:
The statute of limitations applies to trust estates: Id.
Where there is a trustee in existence to represent the cestui que
trust and her rights and interests in the trust estate, the statute of
limitations bars as effectually as if there existed no disability in
the cestui que trust: Id.
Beasonableness of Time.-Where a right springs not from h contract, but from legislative enactment, the action to enforce a claim
under such enactment may be limited by law, and the legislature
is the exclusive judge of the reasonableness of the time allowed within which the action may be brought: DeMoss v. Newton, 31 Ind.
No exception can be claimed in favor of minors, unless they are
expressly mentioned by the statute as accepted: Id.
A man died in 1854, seized in fee simple of certain real estate,
leaving surviving him a widow and brothers and sisters, but no
child, or father, or mother. The widow took possession of the entire property. Suit for partition, the plaintiffs claiming title to an
undivided interest in the land as brothers and sisters of the deceased : Held, That it was a sufficient answer, that before the commencement of the action more than ninety days had elapsed from
the 9th of March, 1867, when section 3, of the Act of March 4th,
1853 (Acts 1853, p. 55), was repealed and such limitation fixed to
the right of action under its provisions (Acts 1867, p. 204.): Id.
NATIONAL BANKS.

Taxation by States.-The right of the States to tax the shares
of the national banks reaffirmed: National Bank v. Commonwealth,
9 Wall.
The statute of Kentucky taxing bank stock, levies a tax on the
shares of the stockholders, as distinguished from the capital of the
bank invested in Federal securities: Id.
This is true, although the tax is collected of the bank instead of
the individual stockholders: Id.
The doctrine which exempts the instrumentalities of the Federal
government from the influence of State legislation, is not founded
on any express provision of the Constitution, but in the implied
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necessity for the use of such instruments by the Federal govern.
ment: Id.
It is therefore limited by the principle that State legislation,
which does not impair the usefulness or caliability of such instruments to serve that government, is not within the rule of prohi.
bition: Id.
A State law requiring the national banks to pay the tax which
is rightfully laid on the shares of its stock is valid under this limitation of the doctrine: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.-See Railroad.
Railroad Company-Ordinaryand Reasonable Care.-In an
action under the statute, by a father o recover damages from a
railroad company, for the death of his child, aged about five years,
caused by its negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover if it appear that the death resulted from the want of ordinary care and
caution on the part of the defendant, and that the child used such
care as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances, from
one of her age and intelligence, and that the parent or person to
whose care she was entrusted at the time did not, by his negligence,
directly contribute to produce the result complained of: Balt. and
Ohio Railroad Cc. v. The State, use of Fryer, 30 Md.
The terms of ordinary and reasonable care are relative and dependent, and whether such care has been used can only be determined
by considering the age and capacity of the person injured: Id.
In actions under the statute, or in other cases where parties sue
for personal injuries suffered by others than themselves, no recovery can be had if the party entitled to the action be guilty of negligence or the want of care whereby the injury occurred: Id.
Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff.-The plaintiff, who was
returning from market about nine or ten o'clock at night, accompanied by his wife, ran forward with his market basket on his arm
and called to the driver of a street car; the driver.stopped the car,
when the plaintiff got on the front platform, placed his basket
thereon, and asked the driver to be so kind as to take it-he assented; the car was immediately started and the plaintiff was
thrown off, or fell in attempting to get off and was injured. The
plaintiff did not intend to remain on the car as a passenger, but
his wife did intend to ride therein; the intention however of
neither was communicated to the driver: Held,
1. That a regulation of the City IPassenger Railway Company,
prohibiting passengers from getting on or off at the front end oi
any car, and requiring them to enter and descend by the rear platform only, is a reasonable regulation, and knowingly to violate it,
without the compulsion of some existing necessity, is conclusive
evidence of negligence on the part of the passenger; so that, should
he sustain an injury in consequence thereof, he will have no right
of action against the company, notwithstanding the driver may
also have been negligent.
2. That the circumstances that a driver or conductor may have
given permission thus to use the front platform is immaterial: for
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the company cannot be bound by the act of their servant in attempting to dispense with a known and positive regulation.
3. That the fact that a notice of the regulation requiring pas
sengers to enter and to leave the cars by the rear platform only.

was put up inside of all the cars, and legible to all who entered
them, and the fact that the plaintiff had often previously ridden in
the cars were evidence from which it might be inferrid that he
had notice of its existence: Bait. Oily Pas. R. R. GJo. v. Ilitkin.
son, 30 Md.
NUISANOL

Injunction-Obstructing 1tightway.-A private person cannot
enjoin the obstructing of a public highway without sliowing a special and peculiar injury to himself, not common to the public. 'h
fact that the injury to such person is greater in degree than that
to others, does not entitle him to such relief. The injury may In,
to more than one person, but must not embrace the entire public:
McGowan v. White8ides, 31 Ind.
In a complaint to enjoin the obstructing of alpublic highway, the
only averments connecting the plaintiffs with the highway were,
"that it is their usual, convenient and necessary route of travel
from their houses, which are all on or in the vicinity of the road
to their market town and usual place of business; and that without greater or less circuity, when the road is so obstructed, they
and each of them have no other meanus, nor have the plmblic wishing to use the road, of going to and fro, as they have a right to do
for business, comfort and pleasure: Hield, that the complainant
was bad on demurer: Id.
RAiLRoAD.-See Common Carrier-eglignce.
Injury to Passenger.-A railroad train ran beyond the platform
for landing passengers at a certain station, and stopped over a culvert, and the proper servants of the railroad company announced
the name of the station as a notification to the passengers for that
stationthat the train was there, whereupon a passenger for that
station, who had paid the company the fare demanded of him, relying
on the good faith of the company, alighted upon and into said culvert, without his fault or negligence, supposing he was alighting
upon said platform, it being at night and so dark that he could not
see that the train had not stopped at said platform, whereby he was
greatly injured: Ield, that the company was liable for the injury
so received: I. and N. Central R.11. Co.v.Farrell,31 Ind.
A railroad company is not legally responsible for the action ot
persons not its servants in falsely announcing the arrival of a train
at a station, whereby a passenger in attempting to alight from the
train is injured: Id.
SALE

Demt.-Where a seller of goods knowingly makes false repre.
sentations to the buyer as to their quality, but the buyer does not
rely upon such representations and is not deceived thereby, the
seller is not liable for deceit: Bagee v Grossman, 31 Iud.
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Where a seller has made false representations as to the quality
of the goods, but the buyer, in making the purchase relies on a test
of their quality made by his own agent who is not prevented by
any act or word of the seller from testing the goods, the seller is
not liable for deceit: Id.
Upon the trial of an action for deceit in the sale of a quantity of flour, its quality at the time of sale being in question, the
court refused to permit the flour to be examined by the jury to
test its odor: Held, that it was properly excluded: Id.
SHERIrF's SALE.-See

Equity.

SHIPPING.

Strandingof Vessel-Value-GeneralAverage.-To constitute
a voluntary stranding of a vessel it is not necessary that there
should have been a previous intention to destroy or injure the vessel, nor is such intention supposed to exist. It is sufficient that
the vessel was selected to suffer the common peril in the place of
the whole of the associated interests, in order that the remainder
might be saved: Star of Hope, 9 Wall.
The stranding is voluntary whenever the will of man does in
some degree contribute thereto though the existence of the particular
reef or bank on which the vessel grounds was not before known to
the master, and though he did not intend to strand the vessel thereon; provided it sufficiently appear that making the exposure of the
vessel he was aware that stranding was the chief risk incurred by
him, and that it was not wholly unexpected by him: Id.
As a general rule the contributory value of the ship, when she
has received no extraordinary injuries during the voyage, and has
not been repaired on that account, is her value at the time of her
arrival at the termination of the voyage. But where, as in this
case, the ship has sustained injuries during the voyage and undergone repairs, her contributory value is her worth before such repairs were made. In the absence of other proof on this point, her
value in the policy of insurance at the port of departure is competent evidence. From this, however, should be made a just and
reasonable deduction for deterioration: I..
The expenses of an ex parte adjustment made by the charterers
of a ship at the port of delivery are not chargeable in admiralty on
the ship or freight, unless the results were adopted and used in
the court below by the commissioner who stated the adjustment
made under order of the court: I.
Repairs cannot be made by the master unless he has means or
credit; and if he has neither, and his situation is such that he cannot communicate with the owners, he may sell a part of the cargo
for that purpose if it is necessary for him to do so in order to raise
the means to make the repairs. Sacrifices made to raise such
means are the subject of general average, and the rule is the same
whether the sacrifice was made by a sale of the part of a cargo or
by the payment of marine interest: Id.

